Introducing E-Government in Developing Countries Analysis of Egyptian e-Government Services by Elaswad, Othoman & Jensen, Christian D.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners 
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal  
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
   
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Dec 18, 2017
Introducing E-Government in Developing Countries Analysis of Egyptian e-
Government Services
Elaswad, Othoman; Jensen, Christian D.
Published in:
IST-Africa 2016 Conference Proceedings
Link to article, DOI:
10.1109/ISTAFRICA.2016.7530669
Publication date:
2016
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Elaswad, O., & Jensen, C. D. (2016). Introducing E-Government in Developing Countries Analysis of Egyptian e-
Government Services. In P. Cunningham, & M. Cunningham (Eds.), IST-Africa 2016 Conference Proceedings
(pp. 1-13). IEEE. DOI: 10.1109/ISTAFRICA.2016.7530669
Introducing E-Government  
in Developing Countries 
with an analysis of the Egyptian e-Government services 
Abstract: Online Identification and Authentication is an essential requirement for providing 
e-services. Few studies have investigated the challenges facing e-Government and IDM in 
developing countries and, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing research has 
studied the challenges facing online identification and remote authentication in developing 
countries, such as the North Africa Countries (NAC), where a relatively large proportion of 
citizens are illiterate. Therefore, the design of a national IDM system in a NAC must explicitly 
consider illiteracy to allow this group of citizens to benefit from online services. Egypt is one 
of the NAC, which has implemented online identification and authentication services that are 
widely recognized as the most advanced among the NAC. This paper analyses the Egyptian 
digital IDM in order to identify IDM requirements for online identification and authentication 
services that guarantee equal access to online services and an inclusive society. The study 
identifies strengths and weaknesses of the Egyptian e-Government and IDM services, which 
we believe are common to most NAC, since the NAC are quite similar in terms of social 
culture, citizen’s education level and skills, citizen’s behaviours, digital infrastructure and 
legislation, but also common to many other developing countries. Our analysis of the Egyptian 
e-Government services indicates that the security requirements and principle of equal access 
are not fully met, which illustrates the difficulty of introducing e-Government in developing 
countries. 
Keywords: Authentication and Identity management. 
1. Introduction 
The introduction of new technology in the public sector aims to improve public services to 
citizens and businesses, increase convenience and reduce costs; this is commonly called e-
Government[1][2]. Introducing new technology has an impact on the modes of interaction 
between citizens and the government, e.g. changing public services from face-to-face 
interactions into online services requires online validation of the citizen’s identity and 
access rights[3][4]. 
 Identity management (IDM) is a complex process that aims to perform online 
identification and authentication and manage the process of identity creation, registration, 
issuing, storing, revocation, recovery and verification. Each of these processes is exposed to 
different types of threats if not managed well. The most common models of IDM are 
Federated Identity Management Systems (FIDMS) and User Centric IDM. The difference 
between these two approaches depends on the level of user control over the disclosure of 
sensitive information when a service provider requests information. In User Centric IDM, 
explicit user consent is required before the IDM discloses any information. The main 
entities in any IDM system (IDMS) are Identity Provider (IP), Service Provider (SP) and 
the User (U). The IP is responsible for creating and registering identities and issuing 
credentials that allow identification and authentication. The IP is also responsible for 
revoking credentials when the credential is compromised or lost or when the citizen dies. 
The SP is the entity that provides services to the users. The user is any entity that requests a 
service from the SP. There are various factors that affect the design of an IDMS, such as 
legislation and regulation, digital infrastructure, cultural norms, social relationships, user’s 
behaviour and skills. Many governments around the world have introduced modern IDMS 
to replace paper based systems[5]. Various designs of National ID (NID) have been 
implemented in different ways, e.g. Denmark provides a software solution for online 
authentication and digital signature called NemID[6][7] and Finland has issued an e-id card 
with PIN for online authentication and digital signature[8]. The main drivers behind 
implementing national IDM is to improve the identification and authentication mechanisms 
to help reduce crime, combat terrorism, eliminate identity theft, control immigration, stop 
benefit fraud, and provide better service to both citizens and legal immigrants[9]. However, 
introducing such unique number projects raises a number of complex risks, such as 
duplication, impersonation and other ID related crimes. Although the benefits of most 
national ID schemes are fairly similar, the culture and historical context in terms of digital 
infrastructure and citizen skills may be quite different in different countries, so those factors 
affect the design of a national ID systems[10].  
 The different designs of IDM systems reflect the educational, cultural and technological 
state of the country in which they are implemented. This means that solutions proposed for 
developed countries do not necessarily work in developing countries that may have large 
illiterate populations or where the populations have limited access to networked 
infrastructure. 
 A number of developing countries, such as the Gulf countries and North African 
Countries (NAC), have adopted e-Government projects. For example, one study[11] did 
conduct a comparative analysis across 16 Arab developing countries to assess the e-
Government services provided by those countries. This study shows that Egypt’s e-
Government portal provides one-way information flows, two-way interaction and E-
democracy, while Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia only provide one-way information flows. 
To provide two-way interaction service delivery, online identification and authentication is 
required. This paper aims to study the strengths and weaknesses of the Egyptian digital 
IDM. Egypt is selected as a best case study among NAC for various reasons. As we 
mentioned above, Egypt is similar to other North Africa Countries in terms of culture, 
social relationship, citizen’s skills and behaviours. Egypt has a high population rate, so 
most of the common social habits and skills will be exhibited in Egyptian society. Egypt is 
the best case among other NAC in the context of providing online services identified in the 
previously mentioned study[11]. Therefore, if Egyptian’s digital identity management fully 
meets the requirements of including bot literate and illiterate citizen, it may be generalized 
to other NAC as well. This paper analyses some specific cases, which include the Egyptian 
online Civil State services and the Egyptian Ahly online National bank to understand the 
strength and weakness of the Egyptian IDM. To this end, we introduce a simple model that 
describes the IDM phases and the requirement for each phase.  
 The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows: Related work will be discussed in 
the next section and the IDM simple model is introduced in the following section. Section 4 
describes the Egyptian e-Government services. The case studies and lessons learned are 
presented in section 5. Section 6 presents the overall conclusions of the study. 
2. Related Work 
The online environment allows for the collection and interconnection of larger amounts of 
information than ever before. This may have tremendous benefits to both governments and 
citizens, but it also creates several risks that did not exist in the more traditional paper-
based systems. For instance, one Norwegian study reported that, in 2004, members of the 
Norwegian Public Service Pension Fund (NPSPF) could apply for loans online by simply 
entering their social security number (SSN). If the SSN was valid and belonged to an 
NPSPF’s member, then the sender would receive a message containing information, such as 
the person’s name, address and zip code. The author of the Norwegian study showed that it 
was possible to determine valid SSN using NPSPF’s loan web page by implementing a 
script to build a database containing the previously mentioned information and furthermore, 
it is possible to classify SSN to a set of people based on specific area using zip code. The 
author reported that they informed NPSPF, the Data Inspectorate and Independent 
administrative body under the Norwegian Ministry of Labour and government 
administration and they showed them SSN and address of both the Norwegian Prime 
Minister and the Director of the Data Inspectorate. This illustrates the dangers of relying on 
secret information with low entropy or a limited search space as authenticators and the 
author concludes that future Internet banking systems must be based on Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKIs) with client certificates to strengthen customer authentication[12] . 
 One study[10] reported that Government identity management can be implemented in 
different ways, so it is useful to assess these differences against historical, cultural and 
social backgrounds and these elements can often be as important as technology in 
determining an approach to identity management. Accordingly, the public and private 
sectors are now producing a wide range of reference frameworks aimed at achieving 
consistency in designing privacy and security into identity management systems and as a 
result, they are gaining greater community acceptance. The authors took New Zealand’s 
identity management as an example case. New Zealand’s identity management system is 
based on a Government Login system to provide both single and multifactor authentication 
to support services with different transaction values and associated risks, while 
identification is performed via the Identity Verification Service (IVS). The authors 
conclude that the New Zealand example demonstrates the value of starting from a sound 
understanding of the policy environment and a clear vision of what is to be achieved. 
 In 2004, a research team at Al Akhwayn University in Morocco collaborated with 
Canadian researchers to implement and deploy a project to transform the Bureaux d’Etat 
Civil (BEC) in Ifrane, a city in Morocco. BECs are government offices that keep records of 
citizen’s life events such as birth, marriage, divorces and death. The BEC was, as other 
public administration in most of the developing countries, based on paper records. The 
project aimed to migrate the BEC onto an electronic platform that would provide value to 
the local community, widen the access, improve usability and support illiterate individuals. 
The authors reported that they started by installing IT infrastructure such as wired networks, 
database servers, a firewall and other software. Then they digitalized the information 
records. As a result, automated service delivery has replaced the paper based system and all 
citizens can access the new services through various channels including from an 
employee’s desk, an information Kiosk or online through the e-Fez portal[13]. This study 
illustrates the current poor digital infrastructure of public administration in most of 
developing country and especially in NAC and the importance of digitalizing Civil State 
Organization as an essential element. The project explicitly considered illiterate individuals 
who represent a higher rate of citizens in NAC.  Team projects of e-governments in NAC 
should consider this part of the population during early stages of initiatives; otherwise they 
might have negative effects on the success of projects. Authors did not mention how a 
citizen’s identity is validated online. Moreover, that paper does not specify how the 
illiterate population access and benefit from the new system. Another study related the main 
challenges faced NAC in terms of Information Technology Security into culture and social 
consideration such as user behaviour and lack of knowledge exchange about computer 
crimes between police officers in these countries[14][15]. 
 
 
 
3. SIMPLE MODEL OF IDM FOR NORTH AFRICA COUNTRIES 
The aim of this model is to identify the requirement of each phase of digital identity 
management. These phases include the registration process, creation of a digital identity, 
credential issues and management of credentials as illustrated in Figure 1. The following 
subsections will describe the requirements for each of these phases. We distinguish between 
National Identity and Digital Identity. All citizens should have a national identity, which is 
recorded by one of the government authorities, such as civil state registration, whereas a 
digital identity is only required by a citizen who wishes to access online services. To allow 
the Identity Provider to validate the citizen’s identity online, the first step is, for a citizen to 
apply to get a digital identity. The Registration Authority (RA) verifies the submitted 
information to check if the applicant is qualified or not. An applicant is considered qualified 
if he satisfies the requirements defined in the registration process mentioned later. Step 2 ̶ 5 
in Fig. 1 shows the process of determining whether an applicant is qualified or not.  If an 
applicant is qualified, then the digital identity will be sent to the applicant as shown in step 
7 and the issued ID will be stored as shown in step 6. Otherwise, the request will be rejected 
as shown in step 8. As an applicant gets the digital identity he then needs to apply for a 
credential that will link to the issued digital identity as shown in step 9. This created 
credential will be temporary and only used to activate the account. Finally, an applicant 
needs to activate his/her account by accessing an activation service and entering the digital 
identity and the temporary credential to create his secret that will be associated with his 
digital identity for subsequent access online services. Later, when a citizen requests online 
service using his/her digital identity and the associated secret, the identity provider will 
validate the entered identity before providing the requested service. The following sub 
sections will describe each phase of the model in more detail. 
 
 
Figure 1A Simple Model of Online Authentication 
3.1 Registration Process  
The first step of IDM process consists of the registration process, where an applicant may 
either show up in person or register remotely. In both cases, the Registration Authority 
(RA) must verify the authenticity of the applicant, i.e. it must protect against the main 
threats to the registration process, which are fabrication, impersonation and repudiation of 
registration. This translates into the following operational goals, the RA must ensure; that 
the applicant’s National ID number is registered in the National Database, that the number 
belongs to the applicant and that it is difficult for the applicant to repudiate the registration 
later. Another requirement is to ensure that the applicant has not been issued with a digital 
identity before. The RA must identify mechanisms that satisfy the above requirement to 
avoid such threats. 
3.2 Credential Issue 
When an applicant has been identified and authenticated, a Credential Service Provider 
(CSP) is responsible for issuing credentials and associating necessary secrets, such as 
passwords, with the proven identity. The first requirement in this phase is to verify digital 
identity of the applicant and ensure that it belongs to that applicant. Ensure uniqueness of 
issued credentials by ensuring that each digital identity should have one credential 
associated with it is also required. Then, the CSP needs to protect the channel used to 
deliver the issued credentials to the applicant against modification or disclosure. For 
example, the average citizens in NAC have limited computer skills, so email is often not a 
secure way to send secrets to the applicant. This requirement aims to ensure the integrity 
and confidentiality of secrets during transportation. The other requirement in this phase is to 
ensure that secrets have been received by the right applicant. 
3.3 Recover Secrets 
The aim of this phase is to help citizens in case they lose or forget the secrets. There are 
different mechanisms that can be used to recover secrets, e.g. challenge-response questions 
and one time password are examples of mechanisms that could be used for recovering 
secrets. Each of these mechanisms has different design options. In a Challenge-response 
question mechanism, which is the most common mechanism, a user selects a questions or 
an answer given a system generated question that the user must answer during the 
registration phase. Later on, when a user has forgotten or lost his credential, the user can 
use a recovery feature to reset his secret which is associated with his digital identity.  In the 
recovery phase, a system submits the registered question to the user and the user must 
provide the registered answer to that question. If the answer is easy to guess by others, then 
it will be easy for an attacker to perform an impersonation attack. Therefore, the 
vulnerability of the recovery system will affect the security of the whole system. Recovery 
systems are not often used, as we mentioned above, so some users may forget the 
appropriate answer related to the recorded question. Therefore, a balance between security, 
privacy and usability measures should be considered by satisfying the following 
requirements. The system should ensure difficulty of guessing answers and difficulty of 
getting answers from public sources. The system should be limited to collect non-public 
information. The system should give sufficient retry attempts to give a user more chance to 
remember the appropriate answer to a challenge-question. 
 
3.4 Policies and strategies 
An organization should identify its own security policy regarding the type of tokens to be 
used in terms of the required security level, lifetime of credentials, procedures for 
renewal/reissuance, revocation and destruction. The stored data such as digital identity 
information and the information used by a user to prove his identity during registration 
requires ensuring confidentiality and integrity. Also, a system should ensure that, provided 
services such as activation process and validation process are always available to legitimate 
citizens. A system should have mechanisms for renewal/reissuance of secrets and 
credentials based on the organization’s security policy. A system should be able to retrieve 
information in case of failure. Any vulnerability in management of credentials and stored 
records will violate the security of the system. 
3.5 Online Identification and Authentication 
The strengths of verifying a citizen’s identity and remotely authenticating citizens is based 
on the strengths of the previous processes including the registration process, issuing 
credentials and strengths of secrecy recovery. Another requirement is that the 
communication channel, during online transaction, should be secure. Uniqueness and 
accuracy of stored data is also required to enable verifier accept or reject the request. The 
number of retrying should not exceed allowed attempts to avoid the authentication service 
acting as an oracle.  
4. Egyptian e-Government 
Egypt is one of the North Africa Countries, with a population of 75 Million. It has an 
illiteracy rate of about 45% and 23% of all Egyptians live under the poverty line[16]. 
During the past decades, the Egyptian government has carried out various reforms of the 
civil services. In 1985, the information and decision support center was formed to support 
government initiatives that support public access to government information[17][18]. In 
1999, the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology was formed to facilitate 
Egypt’s transition into the global information society [19][17]. In 2004 Egyptian’s portal 
pilot project started to provide some online services, such as access to telephone bills. The 
vision of e-Government in Egypt is to provide public services in a way that suits all 
citizens[19]. The Ministry of State for Administrative Development (MSAD) has initiated a 
number of projects aimed at building and integrating an Egyptian Citizens National 
Databases. Also, the MSAD has reviewed all public services and identified the most 
frequently requested public services, in order to unify the decrees governing service 
delivery and minimize the required documents and procedures. This has resulted in public 
services provided through the Internet or telephone services, thus serving as a one-stop-
shop[16]. Some of these services target citizens while others target the business community. 
Examples of citizen services include birth certificate/National ID replacement services, the 
college enrolment guide, car license renewal, tourism complaints, Egypt Air flight services, 
electricity bills inquiry and online public libraries. Examples of business services include 
customs services, online banking, export guide and registration for a commercial 
license[16][19]. One study reported that more than 70% of public services are provided on 
the Egyptian government’s portal and that the Egyptian e-Government initiative has 
achieved the stage of allowing online transaction[20].  
This paper aims to study the security strengths and weaknesses of Egypt’s online 
identification and authentication. To achieve this goal, we need to consider some scenarios 
of Egyptian online services to identify security issues. The Civil State Organization is one 
of the most important services. It is responsible for registration of Egyptian citizens’ civil 
state, i.e. the civil state registration services, and issues an essential document that is used 
by other e-Government services. For example, a citizen needs a NID to open a bank 
account. Also, a citizen needs a birth certificate to apply for a driver’s license. Also, online 
financial services need to deal with sensitive information, which must be protected, and 
such service requires authenticating citizen’s identity before any transaction takes place. In 
the following section, we describe Egypt’s civil state registration services and Ahly net 
banking scenarios. 
5. Case Analysis 
5.1 Case 1 Egypt’s civil state registration 
The main online services provided by the Egyptian Civil State Organization include issuing 
of NID, Birth Certificates, Death Certificates, Marriage Certificates, Divorce Certificates 
and Family Certificates. The process of obtaining any of these documents requires an 
applicant to access the Egyptian e-services portal and choose the Civil State Organization 
service. Then the citizen needs to select the requested document. After that, the citizen 
needs to go through three steps. First, the applicant must fill in the personal information 
including relationship to the applicant, name of the applicant, mother’s name and NID 
number. The second step is to fill in the same information if the applicant applied on behalf 
of a relative. Finally, an applicant selects payment method. An applicant can pay online or 
when receiving the required certificate. Within 72 hours, an applicant should receive the 
requested document. There is no process that verifies the link between the entered national 
number and the applicant at the time of application. 
 In the following, we analyse the security of the Civil State Organization e-service 
transactions to identify possible risks that might affect the organization as well as the 
citizens. We use the CORAS approach for Risk Analysis. It consists of three parts including 
Language, Tools and Methods. The CORAS language uses diagrams that are often used 
during brainstorming session. The CORAS tools is a graphical editor use to make CORAS 
diagrams. CORAS Method uses to describe CORAS Risk analysis [21].    
Figure 2 uses a CORAS Risk Diagrams to show possible threat scenarios that may lead to 
unwanted incidents and cause risks. As the citizens’ education level limits the access to e-
services, we classify citizen into citizens and illiterate citizens (those who cannot read and 
write). Employees of the state organisation are also considered a type of citizen that may 
accidentally or maliciously initiate a threat. 
The first class of citizens is an educated citizen who has sufficient knowledge to enable 
him/her to interact with the system. This type of citizen may initiate one of the two threats 
Risk Diagram for the Egyptian State Organization 
shown in Figure 2. A literate citizen may have limited computer skills, and be unfamiliar 
with online attacks and malicious software. All these vulnerabilities, and others, will make 
different type of threats, such as phishing attacks, possible. Phishing attacks will lead to 
unauthorized access incident. As a result of unauthorized access incident both citizen’s 
record and organization’s reputation may be harmed. Also, a literate citizen may share or 
record confidential information, e.g. users often record their passwords on a piece of paper. 
Such actions initiate a threat of disclosure of information, which makes additional privilege 
escalation threats possible. These types of threats will lead to unwanted incidents including 
loss of reputation and abuse as shown in Figure 2. Reputation incidents will harm the 
organization’s finances, while abuse incidents will harm the citizens as well as the 
organization’s reputation. 
The second class of citizen is the illiterate citizens. These are unable to interact directly 
with the system due to inability to read or write, they normally ask literate people for help 
to apply on their behalf. This means that some risks identified above may also be initiated 
by illiterate citizen. 
The third class of citizens is government employees, e.g. Civil State Organization 
employees. If employees are unware about the technologies adopted by the Civil State 
Organization, then the risk of misconfiguration is possible. Misconfiguration may result in 
system failures as shown in Figure 2. System failures may lead to unavailable services 
which is an unwanted incident. Unavailability will prevent authorized citizens from 
accessing services, which will affect the organization’s reputation. The other possible threat 
initiated by an employee is unwitting such as input errors. Such errors will affect integrity 
of data and as a result harm to the citizen’s information record as well as the organization’s 
reputation. 
There is no identity verification to prevent unauthorized access, so any citizen who has 
an NID or knows another citizen’s NID can access the Egyptian civil state e-services and 
apply for a document using that NID. There is also no access control mechanism 
implemented to prevent unauthorized access. Moreover, the disclosure of a citizen’s 
sensitive information may lead to risks of identification from aggregated data. Illiterate 
citizens unable to interact with web portals since she cannot read and write. Illiterate with 
limited technology skills might unfamiliar with new technologies. Therefore, such groups 
and disabilities citizens might have unequal access opportunity with literate citizens. 
Disabled citizens and illiterates may disclose their information to others when they ask for 
help and this leads to disclosure of sensitive information and as a result creates various 
types of unwanted incidents. 
 
5.2 Case 2 National Bank of Egypt (NBE) 
NBE developed its services and products to provide the bank’s customers with remote 
banking services and the bank has introduced a phone cash service that is independent of 
any mobile network in Egypt. Customers can use such services to pay phone bills, book 
airline tickets and transfer cash in a safe way. In 2002, the bank introduced online bank 
services including Ahly net Retail, Ahly net Corporate, Ahly E-shopping and Mobile 
payment services. This service has been added to Egypt’s portal. To benefit from such 
services a customer needs to register with Ahly net service 
(www.alahlynet.com.eg/eBanking). The registration steps are: 
 An applicant needs to show up in person to one of the bank’s branches. 
 An applicant needs to bring proof of his/her identity attributes. 
 An applicant fills in two application forms, one for updating personal information and 
the other for requesting to subscribe to the Ahly net service. 
 The bank issues a National Bank of Egypt Identity number (NBEID) that consists of 8 
digits. 
 The NBEID will be sent to the applicant through applicant’s email. 
 The bank issues a passcode consisting of 4 digits and sends it to the applicant’s mobile 
phone. 
As an applicant receives those credentials, the activation process will start by contacting a 
call centre. The applicant will be directed to enter both NBEID and passcode. The call 
centre system will automatically validate the entered credentials. If the verification of the 
entered credentials succeeds, then the applicant will be asked to enter a new passcode 
(TPIN) consisting of four digits. The entered TPIN will now be used as a password when an 
applicant accesses online. If verification fails, an applicant will be transferred to the bank’s 
customer service for help, but if the verification succeeds, the applicant will be forced to set 
answers to secret questions that will be used in case the password is later forgotten. The 
three questions are as follows: 
 Applicant’s mother’s median name 
 Applicant’s preferred color 
 Applicant’s preferred team. 
During the subsequent logins, an applicant will be asked to enter the NBEID as a username 
and the TPIN as a password and the system then verifies these credentials. 
Password recovery 
If a customer forgets the password, there will be three attempts to answer one of the 
security questions that were set during first time login. If a customer answers the question 
correctly within three attempts, then the old password will be reset and a customer needs to 
create a new password. If he fails to correctly answer the security question, then a customer 
can enter the TPIN instead of the challenge questions. If the verification of TPIN succeeds 
then the customer can create a new password. If verification of the TPIN also fails, then a 
customer needs to contact the bank’s customer service. 
NBE Password policy 
The IT department of the National Bank of Egypt has issued a number of password 
policies to make the customer’s password strong to resist attacks such as guessing attack. 
The main password policies of NBE are passwords cannot consist of all characters or 
applicant’s user name, the password length should be between 8 and 28 characters and the 
password should use a mixture of numbers and characters. Every three months the 
password should be changed.  
Due to the registration requirement, it is difficult, if not impossible, for someone to 
impersonate another customer during the registration phase, e.g. an applicant is required to 
show up in person and prove his identity. Moreover, an applicant needs to fill in forms to 
ensure non-repudiation of registration later. These requirements fulfill the requirements 
identified in the registration process of our model. On the other hand, there are a number of 
weaknesses which may possibly impact the security of the system. Figure 3 shows a few 
scenarios that may cause unwanted incidents. Some of these vulnerabilities arise because of 
weaknesses in password recovery and the password policies. Other vulnerabilities relate to 
the bank’s customer. As we mentioned in the section above, a bank will send the NBEID to 
a customer through the customer’s email and send the TPIN to the customer’s mobile 
phone. The average customer has limited computer skills, so they may be unable to protect 
their computers from malicious software, such as key-loggers, spyware and viruses, and 
they do often not know how to handle phishing emails. Therefore, if a customer’s email is 
hacked, the NBEID will be discovered. If a hacker obtains the NBEID, then the features of 
password recovery can be used to get the password belonging to the customer’s ID. This 
may result in unauthorized access to the system, which leads to harm to the customer’s 
account as well as impact on public image of the Bank. The security requirement of 
password recovery has failed to fulfill the identified requirement of a recovery system as 
well as the management of credentials as defined in our model. As a result, it may be 
possible to violate the security of the whole system.  Also, the password policy of the bank 
requires customers to change their password every three months, so every three months a 
customer needs to remember a new password with a length between 8-28 characters. This 
requirement leads to issues of forgotten passwords and may force some users to write down 
their password, in order to remember them. However, forgotten passwords prevent 
customers from accessing bank services for a period of time. Also, as hackers discover 
credentials able to change password as a result preventing legal customer from accessing 
service. Hackers might violate recovery system and reset customer’s password and as a 
result prevent a customer from accessing services. Some of the bank’s customers are 
illiterate so they may ask others for help, which forces them to disclose their credentials to 
others, which may lead to additional privilege incidents as well as repudiation incidents. All 
these issues arise because of poor identity management.  
Figure 3 shows possible threats against National bank of EgyptFigure 2 CORAS 
5.3 Lessons learned and recommendations 
The Egyptian case illustrates that some developing countries may provide online services 
before implementing online identification and authentication systems. The fact that some 
organizations consider something that is not secret, e.g. an applicant’s favorite football 
team, as an authenticator exposes systems to various online attacks. There is a failure to 
achieve the vision of equal access, e.g. illiterate people are not considered and, as a result, 
they are likely to circumvent the system by performing illegal delegation to benefit from the 
online services. Some organizations implement poor online authentication and force users 
to carry the risk. For example, Ahly net bank’s policy mentions that a customer is 
responsible for all transactions carried by the bank based on the customer’s credentials until 
the bank receive written declaration from a customer to indicate that credentials are stolen, 
while the bank’s security questions are vulnerable to various attacks such as guessing 
attack.  Selection of authentication method should suits   citizen’s skills and ability as well 
as society culture. For example, user name –password is not suitable authentication method 
for Al-ahly bank because, some of customers are illiterate so they easily submit their 
passwords to others when they asking other’s help. 
 To resist online attacks and achieve the required objectives of NAC e-Governments, as 
well as other developing countries, we propose the model defined in Section III, which is 
based on the requirements to help NAC transition from paper based systems to online 
systems securely. Before providing online services to its citizens, a country must design and 
implement online identification and authentication systems. The first steps to introduce 
digital IDMS start by digitalizing the citizen’s record in the Civil State Organization or 
similar government authority that record citizen’s information. The process of digitalizing 
citizen’s record is not just creating a digital database and transferring all records into digital 
form. It also needs to sanitize all the information stored in the paper based system to ensure 
the uniqueness, accuracy, completeness and consistency of the information. It must also 
introduce digital legislation and regulation that specify the accountability of each entity in 
the digital transactions and identify activities that are considered as digital crimes. It must 
organize the interaction between government bodies, citizens and businesses using digital 
documents and media. After that, a government needs to identify the goals of electronic 
IDM, e.g. will it be used to identify citizens online applications or for both offline and 
online transactions. All these considerations impact on the shape of electronic identity 
management. The following requirements to be considered to provide e-services that 
support majority of citizens: 
 Implementing online Identification and authentication is a precondition for 
provisioning e-services. 
 Provide a wide range of access means to support a large portion of society including 
illiterate individuals. 
 An identity provider is responsible for the entire identity management process, 
including issuing, activation, revocation, renewing and performing online identity 
verification as the model explained in section III. 
 A system should be able to prevent illegal activities such as illegal delegation.  
 A token should be composed of more than one authentication factor. This requirement 
is aimed to make sharing or describing secrets is more difficult while using them is 
easier. 
 The communication channels between parties should be reliable and secure.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Many developing countries, as well as developed countries, are providing online services to 
their citizens. Providing such services require protection of services and the citizen’s 
sensitive information against online incidents such as financial loss, abuse incidents and 
unavailability of services. Therefore, security properties including Confidentiality, Integrity 
and Availability have to be considered when introducing digital IDM to ensure the 
protection of services and citizens. Understanding and analyzing citizen’s behaviors, social 
culture and the citizen’s ability are as important as the other components of IDM. This 
paper introduces a simple model that illustrates e-IDM process including registration 
process, issuing of digital identity, association of secrets and digital identity and finally 
login. To understand strengths and weakness of online identification and authentication 
management in NAC, Egypt’s digital IDM is selected as a case study.. because of the 
following reasons; Egypt has a greater population than other NAC, which includes many of 
the different social cultures and behaviors in the region. During the past 2 decades, the 
Egyptian government has reformed and initiated many e-government projects; the Egyptian 
e-portal has existed for more than 10 years. Paragraph 2 style and use the tab for the first 
sentence within that paragraph. 
 Analysing some of the Egyptian online services, using the CORAS risk analysis tool, 
shows some possible threats that may lead to disclosure of personal information, escalated 
privileges and unauthorized access. Some of these issues relate to citizens’ with limited 
skills and abilities while others relate to poor management of identity. For example, we 
have seen in the scenario section, that it may be possible to hack a citizen’s email and then 
exploit the feature of forgotten password to reset the password. Exploiting password 
recovery mechanisms indicate poor management of identity and credentials. This 
emphasizes the need to implement online identification and authentication that support the 
majority of citizens including disabled individuals and illiterate citizens. Therefore, 
countries which have illiterate people should study how this group can benefit from e-
services without affecting security of systems.  The complexity of introducing digital IDM 
raises the issue of whether a violation of one service will affect other services in a federated 
group. Therefore, the Egyptian e-Government, as well as other developing countries, need 
to identify citizen’s requirements as well as the technology and digital infrastructure to 
resist cybercrimes which has not previously existed in their society. 
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